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Class S. A note payable in one year or "if crop * * * is below
eight bushels per acre this note shall be extended one year" was held ne-
gotiable.12 A trade acceptance providing in margin "Should maker * * *
suffer a fire loss * * * this trade acceptance at option of holder shall
become due and payable" was held negotiable.1S A note payable in twelve
months or before if made out of the sale of a machine was held negotiable.14
Class 4. It is only the class of commercial paper that provides for accele-
ration where the power to accelerate is wholly within the control of the
holder that is held non-negotiable. Why this should be is hard to see. Cer-
tainly the Statute does not so discriminate. The language is broad, being
"on or before a fixed or determinable future time." In fact such language
would seem to include this type of instrument. Nothing is said that should
permit the maker to accelerate and not also include an acceleration con-
trolled by the holder. To admit the negotiability of the other three types
mentioned in this note and exclude the fourth type seems to be a wholly
illogical construction of the statute. In a demand note the power to declare
the note due is wholly within the control of the holder.
The crux of the situation seems best stated by Prof. Ralph W. Aigler
in 22 Mich. Law Review 710. "If certainty is required, as primarily it is
believed to be, so that the paper may be computed with reasonable business
precision as to its money value and so steps may be taken to hold parties
secondarily liable, there is much more reason for objecting to acceleration
provisions depending on the maker's whim." I. D. P.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REGuLATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESSES-The plain-
tiffs, private contract carriers, brought this suit against several state and
county officials to enjoin the enforcement of a Texas statute which provided
for the regulation of contract carriers by motor vehicle.1 This act gave
the Railroad Commission authority to regulate such carriers,2 and among
other things, gave it the power to fix minimum rates3 and to require a per-
mit,4 the granting of which was to be conditioned upon proof that the
operation of the applicant carrier would not interfere with the efficient
service of authorized common carriers. The plaintiffs contend that "the
result of this statute is to compel them to dedicate their property to the
quasi public use of public transportation before they can operate their
motors over the highways, and thus to take their property for public use
without adequate compensation, and to deprive them of their property
without due process of law." From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiffs
appeal. Held, affirmed.5
In several cases the Supreme Court has held that rate regulation is
unconstitutional outside of public callings-that is, "businesses affected
'2Zt. Bank7 of Halstedw . Bilstad, 152 Iowa 433, 136 N. W. 204.
'3McCormick, v. Gem State Oil, etc., Co., 38 Ida. 470, 222 Pae. 286, 34 A. L. 1-.
867, noted by Aigler in 22 Mich. L. Rev. 710.
"Ernst v. Steccman, 74 Pa. St. 13 (1873).
'Acts Tex., 1931, c. 277; Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Tax., Art. 911(b).
2 See. 4.
3 Sec. 4 and See. 6 (aa).
' Sec. 6 (a).
Stephenson V. Binford, United States Supreme Court, Dec. 5, 1932, 53 & Ct. 181.
RECENT CASE NOTES
with a public interest."6 The court has also held (or rather assumed) that
it is unconstitutional to require a certificate of convenience and necessity
as a condition precedent to carrying on a private business.7 While the
permit required by the statute under consideration is not exactly a certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity, its effect is substantially the same, and
the same rule should apply. Are these cases overruled? Is it now the view
of the Supreme Court that these regulations, heretofore only constitutional
in the field of public callings, may be imposed upon private businesses?
In upholding the statute the court purported to go upon the theory that
the regulations imposed were mere police regulations to preserve the high-
ways and make them safe for the public. But, while they might indirectly
result in some benefit of this kind, such regulations as these can hardly be
classified as highway measures, for they are primarily business regulations. 8
The statute itself sets out as one of the legislature's purposes in enacting
it the prevention of rate discrimination.9 Regardless of this, it seems that
if the scope of the legislative police power is great enough to allow the
regulation of private businesses in order to protect the highways, it would
also be great enough to cover their regulations for the purposes of improv-
ing the transportation system and protecting common carriers. It seems,
then, that this case cannot be distinguished upon its facts from those
cited above.
Just what, then, did this case hold? It did not hold that private carriers
are common carriers, for there was an attempt to distinguish the cases of
Frost v. The Railroad Commission,lo and Michigan Public Utilities Com-
mnission v. Duke1 upon the grounds that the statutes there involved did
make private carriers common carriers. The court did not hold that private
carriers are not common carriers but are nevertheless public callings, for it
expressly said that it was not necessary to determine whether or not they
were in a business affected with a public interest. The only alternative left
is that the regulations here involved may be imposed upon a private busi-
ness. That, in the last analysis, is the holding of this case.
Heretofore the court has refused to sustain any statute fixing rates or
requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity for private businesses
upon the theory that such regulation was not within the scope of the state's
police power and was, therefore, a deprivation of property without due
process of law.12 In other words, it has been held that unless a business is
one "affected with a public interest" the social interests in favor of such
regulation could not outweigh those in favor of the personal liberties pro-
tected. In recent years the Supreme Court has adopted virtual monopoly
plus indispensable service as the test for determining when a business is a
public calling.13 Until the principal case was decided, then, the Court was
6 Tyson v. Benton (1926), 273 U. S. 418, 47 S. Ct. 426; Ribneck 'v. McBride
(1927), 277 U. S. 350, 48 S. Ct. 545; Williams v. The Standard Oil Co. (1928), 278
U. S. 235, 49 S. Ct. 115.7 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (1932), 285 U. S. 262, 52 S. Ct. 371.
9 See note In 31 Mich. L. Rev. 395.
9 See. 22 (b).
(1926), 271 U. S. 583, 46 S. Ct. 605.
"(1925), 266 U. S. 570, 45 S. Ct. 191.
12 See note 6 and 7, supra.
n Block v. Hirsch (1921), 256 U. S. 135, 41 S. Ct 458; Tagg Bros. v. The United
States (1929), 280 U. S. 420, 50 S. Ct. 220; Williamnav. Standard Oil Co., supra.
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of the opinion that there could never be social interests enough in favor
of applying this sort of regulation to any business, except one in which
there was virtual monopoly plus indispensable service, to outweigh the
opposing social interests.
The principal case is one of the most revolutionary ones decided by
the Supreme Court for years. It is difficult to tell just where it will lead.
If the control applied here can be imposed upon a private business under
the ordinary rules of police power, there is no logical reason why other
burdens, so far only borne by public callings, cannot likewise be imposed
upon private enterprises. Thus they might be made to serve everyone,
without discrimination, and to provide reasonably adequate facilities wher-
ever the court is able to find sufficient social interests to justify the burden
under the ordinary rules of police power.
This decision is of particular interest at this time. It dispels much doubt
as to the constitutionality of the Domestic Allotment Bill and other legisla-
tion of a similar nature. It neems altogether possible that the court may
have been consciously paving the way for holding such plans constitutional.
W. H. H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ADMINISTRATYE DuTi s OF THE JUDIcIARY-DuE
PRocESS-Pursuant to the provisions of the Indiana Statute,1 the appellee
filed in the office of the clerk of the superior court, a certified copy of a
compensation agreement, executed by him and his employer, the appellant,
and approved by the Industrial Board. Appellee then petitioned for entry
of judgment. The court rendered the judgment and notified the appellant,
as required by statute.2 The appellant then entered a special appearance
for the purpose of moving the court to vacate and set aside the judgment
heretofore rendered. The motion was overruled and appellant appeals on an
assignment of errors, contending that the statute authorizing the circuit or
superior court to render a judgment in accordance with the award of the
Industrial Board, without a hearing, was unconstitutional in that the said
statute3 imposed administrative duties upon the judiciary in violation of
Article III, Sec. 1 of the State Constitution and denied due process under
Article I, Sec. 12 of the State Constitution and amendment 14 of the Con-
stitution of the United States. Held, that Section 62 of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, providing for the rendition of judgment upon the award of
the Industrial Board without a hearing was not unconstitutional.
The appellant contends that the court's act of entering a judgment was
an administrative act, which is beyond the power of the courts, and there-
fore unconstitutional. 5 It has been held that the power of the courts is
limited to actual cases and controversies by the Federal Constitution.6
'Burns' Revised Statutes, 1926, Section 9507.
2 Supra, Note 1.
3 Supra, Note. 2.
4 Grant Coal Mining Company v. Coleman (1932), 179 N. E. 778.5 In re Atlantic Insurance Co. (N. Y. 1929), 232 N. Y. S. 489; In re Northwest-
ern Indiana Telephone Co. (Ind. 1930), 171 N. E. 65 , State ex tel. and to Use of
Kansas City & So. .. Co. v. Public Service Co. (Mo. 1930), 30 S. W. (2nd) 112.
6 United States 'v. Ferreira (1851), 18 Hrow. 40; Gordon v. United States (1864),
2 Wall. 561; Trega v. Modesto Irrigation District (1896), 164 U. S. 179, 17 Sp. Ct.
52; Muskrat v. United States (1910), 219 U. G. 349, 31 Sp. Ct. 282; Liberty Ware-
house Co. v. Grannis (1927), 277 U. S. 274, 48 Sp. Ct 507.
